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A steady stream of charitable service-users have brought appeals against cy-près
modification decisions made by the First-tier Tribunal (Charity).1 The basis of
their standing—the legal circumstances in which they are permitted to bring a
case—has not yet been adequately developed. In search of a test for standing, this
article takes a ground-up approach to the question. It recognises that as a matter
of empirical fact, it is service-users who wish to bring appeals against schemes. It
proposes a flexible prima facie rule recognising service-user standing in most
cases.
Cy-près modification is a well-trodden statutory process, making possible the
variation of charitable trust objects.2 It is a procedure unique to charities established
as trusts; incorporated charities have their own mechanisms.3 It can be used as a
method to update outdated trusts in the light of social change,4 and because all
charities were historically established as trusts,5 cy-près is of vital importance for
charitablemodernisation. In more recent times, in part because of broad and flexible
statutory provisions allowing cy-près modification, and in part because of an
equally broad and flexible policy of the Charity Commission for England and
Wales,6 which carries through the great bulk of cy-près alterations, it has become
relatively easy for trustees to achieve modification.
Trustees are under a legal duty to seek a scheme—a modification of the
constitution—where it is necessary to secure the effective use of funds.7 Sometimes
this change or modernisation will be controversial, particularly with service-users.8
*University of Liverpool
1 See T. Anderson, The Charities Acts Handbook: A Practical Guide (Bristol: LexisNexis, 2016), 296–301. The
First-tier Tribunal (Charity) started life as the Charity Tribunal but took on a new name subject to the Tribunals,
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
2Contained in Charities Act 2011 ss.63(1), 67(3).
3Charities Act 2011 ss.197–200, 224–227.
4 See, e.g. R. Mulheron, The Modern Cy-près Doctrine: Applications and Implications (London: UCL, 2006),
130–132.
5But see J. Picton, “Reforming the Prerogative Cy-près Doctrine” (2014) 6 Conv. 473.
6Charity Commission for England andWales, “OG2 Application of Property Cy-près” (2012) at http://webarchive
.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140505103125/http://ogs.charitycommission.gov.uk/g002a001.aspx [Accessed 30 August
2018].
7Charities Act 2011 s.61.
8See, e.g.Ground v Charity Commission & The Guildford Diocesan Board of Finance CA/2011/0004 6 December
2011 (Ft-T (Charity)); Baddeley v Sparrow [2015] UKUT 420 (TCC); Aliss & Hesketh v Charity Commission
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The First-tier Tribunal (Charity) has provided a new forum to appeal the
Commission’s scheme.9 As that decision is very likely to have been made in
consultation with the charity’s trustees,10 such cases will often represent an internal
disagreement in the charity, a source of tension between the service-users and the
trustees. Service-users can be understood as those people who benefit from a
charity’s provision of goods and services. They are the “recipients” of charity and
so they have a unique stake it in it, but it is also well established law, that they
have no legally enforceable rights.11 They use the charitable service, but they do
not normally have a right to ensure its continuance.
While service users do not have legal rights in the charity, that ought not to
mean that they cannot challenge the decisions of the Commission. There is a very
broad definition of third party standing in the statute. It permits appeals for: “any
other person who is or may be affected by the decision”.12 On an intuitive reading,
most service-users would fall easily within this test. Yet the Upper Tribunal has
recently developed an approach—the “affected legal rights” test—which in fact
restricts third party standing to those circumstances where the prospective appellant
enjoys a legal right which is impacted upon by the Commission’s decisions.13 If
applied beyond the context in which it was developed, this new test could exclude
service-users from bringing cy-près appeal cases.
Rejecting the affected legal rights test for the cy-près context, this article works
towards the development of an appropriate basis for third party standing in cy-près
cases. This is located in an assessment of the policy grounds for permitting appeals
in the First-tier Tribunal (Charity), as well as a ground-up acknowledgement that
the main source “demand” for First-tier Tribunal (Charity) oversight lies with
service-users and not trustees. While service-user based standing cannot be an
automatic or absolute rule, it is an important starting point in any decision as to
whether an individual is a “person who is affected” for the purposes of an appeal.
Policy grounds for permitting cy-près appeals in the tribunal
The Cabinet Office’s Strategy Unit produced a report in 2002, “Private Action,
Public Benefit”.14 It reviewed the charity sector and suggested reforms for the
Government to consider.15Among its successful recommendations was the creation
of a new Charity Tribunal in 2008.16 The system, as it has emerged, comprises the
Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery) (the Upper Tribunal) and the First-tier Tribunal
CA/2011/0007 31 August 2012 (Ft-T (Charity)); Bartley v Charity Commission CA/2013/0016 21 July 2014 (Ft-T
(Charity)).
9Charities Act 2011 ss.315(2)(a), 319(1), Sch.6 col.1. See generally D. Morris, “The First-tier Tribunal (Charity):
Enhanced Access to Justice for Charities or a case of David versus Goliath?” 29(4) C.J.Q. 491.
10Charity Commission for England and Wales, “OG2 Application of Property Cy-près” (2012).
11Thomas v Att-Gen [1937] Ch. 72; [1936] 2 All E.R. 1325 (Ch) at 1328;Morice v Bishop of Durham 32 E.R. 656
at 658; (1804) 9 Ves. Jr. 399 at 405. See W. Barr and R, Stevens, Pearce & Stevens’ Trusts and Equitable Obligations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 367–368.
12Charities Act 2011 Sch.6 col.2(c).
13Nicholson v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2016] UKUT 198 (TCC).
14Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, “Private Action, Public Benefit: A Review of Charities and theWider Not-For-Profit
Sector” (2002).
15Also Public Administration Select Committee, “The Role of the Charity Commission and ‘Public Benefit’:
Post-legislative Scrutiny of the Charities Act 2006—Volume I: Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and
Written Evidence” (HC 2013–14, 76, incorporating HC 2012–13, 574-i-vi); Lord Hodgson, Trusted and Independent:
Giving Charity Back to Charities—Review of the Charities Act 2006 (The Stationery Office 2012).
16Charities Act 2006 (Commencement No.3, Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2008 (SI 2008/751) art.2
and Sch.1.
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(Charity), within the General Regulatory Chamber.17As an element of its powers,18
it can hear appeals against schemes made by the Commission.19 In appeals,20 it
must decide afresh and may consider new evidence.21
The Commission—which finds its decisions challenged in the tribunal
system—regulates the charity sector. Prior to the establishment of the First-tier
Tribunal (Charity), appeals against cy-près decisions of the Commission were
made in the High Court, and relatively rare.22 They were also expensive. While
the Commission does have an internal review process, there was for a long time
a view that the mechanism did not provide sufficient accountability.23 The
establishment of the Tribunal has created a new legal dynamic in which the decision
of the Commission to permit a scheme is more readily challengeable than in the
past.24 The Tribunal has power to: quash the scheme and send it back to the
Commission; substitute a scheme; or add to it.25
The tribunal system a relatively cheap alternative to the ordinary courts.
Litigation costs in the High Court can be prohibitive. There are fees to pay to the
High Court, which can vary depending on the length of the hearing, the financial
value of the dispute, and the remedy sought.26 Legal representation, which is normal
in the High Court, can also be expensive.27 A “suitor’s fund” has, on occasion,
been proposed to cover or minimise costs in important cases, but Parliament has
rejected the idea.28 Instead, it created a right of appeal into the tribunal system so
as to provide a forum for low-cost litigation.29 It is true that legal representation is
allowed in the tribunal system but as it is optional, applicants can go without in
order to avoid legal costs.30 Some litigants-in-person have been successful,31 but
other applicants have chosen to appear with counsel.32 Future plans to introduce
tribunal fees may limit the attractiveness of the tribunal system,33 but it is likely
to remain a cheaper forum than the ordinary court system.
The policy justification for the existence of an appeals process against
Commission decisions feeding into the First-tier Tribunal (Charity) is two-fold.
17Charities Act 2011 s.315(1); First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal (Chambers) Order 2010 (SI 2010/2655) arts
3(b), 13.
18 It also has further functions. A power of review: Charities Act 2011 s.321. A forum for references from the
Commission: Charities Act 2011 s.325. A forum for references from the Att-Gen: Charities Act 2011 s.326.
19Charities Act 2011 ss.315(2)(a), 319(1), Sch.6 col.1.
20Compare reviews: Charities Act 2011 ss.322, 323.
21Charities Act 2011 s.319(4).
22For analysis of the cases see R.Mulheron, TheModern Cy-près Doctrine: Applications and Implications (London:
UCL, 2006), 98–118.
23Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, “Private Action, Public Benefit: A Review of Charities and theWider Not-For-Profit
Sector” (2002) 83–4.
24A. McKenna, “The Charity Tribunal—Where to and From” (2014) 4 P.C.B. 213, 214.
25Charities Act 2011 s.319(5), Sch.6 col.3.
26HMCTS, “EX50A” 25 July 2016 at http://formfinder.hmctsformfinder.justice.gov.uk/ex50a-eng.doc [Accessed
13 August 2018].
27 Public Administration Select Committee, “The Role of the Charity Commission and ‘Public Benefit’:
Post-legislative Scrutiny of the Charities Act 2006—Volume I: Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and
Written Evidence” (HC 2013–14, 76, incorporating HC 2012–13, 574-i-vi), 33, para.99 citing Q 516 (William
Shawcross).
28 e.g. NCVO, “For the Public Benefit? A Consultation Document on Charity Law Reform” (January 2001)
para.4.5.2; HL Deb 28 June 2005, Vol.673 col.214 (Lord Bassam of Brighton).
29Lord Hodgson, Trusted and Independent: Giving Charity Back to Charities—Review of the Charities Act 2006
(The Stationery Office 2012), 80, para.7.14.
30Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (SI 2009/1976) rl.11(1).
31Roger Thomas v Charity Commission CA/2012/0001 19 October 2012 (Ft-T (Charity)).
32Lord Hodgson, Trusted and Independent: Giving Charity Back to Charities—Review of the Charities Act 2006
(The Stationery Office 2012), 82, para.7.20.
33 Justice Committee, “Courts and Tribunals Fees (Second Report)” (HC 2016–17, 167) 12.
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First, the right of appeal is intended to encourage litigation and prevent legal
ossification.34 Secondly, like any other tribunal, it is intended to provide redress.
It “puts right” bad decision-making.35 These policy goals lean heavily towards a
wide right of standing. The wider the right, the more cases will feed into the legal
system, so allowing the twin aims to be achieved.
The first goal: developing the law
Charity law is made up of a large body of cases, many of which are very old. In
recent times, the flow of cases into the ordinary court system has dwindled. This
has created a situation where charitable organisations, many of which are at the
front line of social change, find themselves regulated by an antiquated body of
precedent.
Unfortunately, because of the law’s great vintage, the textbook understanding
of the doctrine often remains rooted in historic case law.36 The old precedents treat
cy-près as a highly restrictive rule prohibiting modification of objects outside of
the exceptional circumstance of the complete failure of the trust. This historic
approach also places the original intention of an often long-dead donor as the
paramount concern in anymodification decision, so that it operates as a conservative
force, holding back change. So Sir John Romilly in Philpott v Saint George’s
Hospital, graphically stated that:
“[The testator’s] directions are not contrary to the law, this Court is bound to
carry that intention into effect … Accordingly, instances of charities of the
most useless description have come before the Court, but which it has
considered itself bound to carry into effect.”37
Similarly, in Re Weir Hospital, Farwell LJ said:
“it is contrary to principle that a testator’s wishes should be set aside, and his
bounty administered not according to his wishes but according to the view
of the Commissioners.”38
These old cases do not reflect the contemporary statutory regime which—as it
will later be seen—sets out a flexible and discretionary machinery, enabling the
Commission in consultation with trustees to make far-reaching changes to existing
charitable trusts. The cases, decided in the High Court, which do interpret the
modern statute are few and far between. They also turn on fact-specific points,
without a great deal of value in terms of wider principle.39 Notably, no case clearly
states that it is possible to “update” a charity with a constitution containing
out-of-date value judgments or attitudes to the class of beneficiaries. This legal
34Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, “Private Action, Public Benefit: A Review of Charities and theWider Not-For-Profit
Sector” (2002) 5; A. McKenna, “Should the Charity Commission be Reformed?” (2011–12) 14 C.L.P.R. 1, 3.
35See T. Ison, “Administrative Justice: Is it such a Good Idea?” inM. Harris andM. Partington (eds), Administrative
Justice in the 21st Century (Oxford: Hart, 1999), 23; H. Genn, “Tribunals and Informal Justice” 56 (1993) M.L.R.
393, 393.
36 See, e.g. L. Sheridan, Keeton and Sheridan’s The Modern Law of Charities (Chichester: Barry Rose, 1992),
212–274; H. Picarda, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (London: Butterworths 1977), 219.
37Philpott v St George’s Hospital 54 E.R. 42; (1859) 27 Beav. 107 at 112.
38Re Weir Hospital [1910] 2 Ch. 124 CA 136 at 138.
39See, e.g. Peggs v Lambe [1994] Ch. 172; [1994] 2 W.L.R. 1; Re Lepton’s Charity [1972] 1 Ch. 262 which clarify
the application of the statute but do not significantly address the broad social circumstances in which modification
is possible.
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silence is also potentially problematic where charities wish to undergo a social
modernisation.
The extent of the problem should not be overstated. It will be seen that the statute
is flexible even if the case-law is not. Trustees may also have access to legal advice,
and the Commission’s own reports reveal that they have been prepared, over time,
to take a flexible approach to modification of objects. Yet a lack of appropriate
and up-to-date case law in the area cannot be understood as a positive feature of
the contemporary law. Solicitors will still engage with old fashioned case-law in
order to interpret the statute. The availability of a new forum in which to bring
cases has the potential, over time, to improve the situation simply by generating
up-to-date decisions in interpretation of the statute.
The second goal: providing a forum for redress
The second policy justification behind cy-près appeals lies in a right of redress
against mistakes in executive administrative decision-making. It can already be
seen from the pattern of the decided cases that there are two key grounds upon
which an appeal is likely to be brought—an error of the Commission relating to
its jurisdiction and an error relating to the Commission’s interpretation and
application of the law.40
Appeals relating to an error of jurisdiction occur where the Commission oversteps
the limits of its statutory powers.41 Notably, the Commission cannot determine
title, nor exercise its powers where there is in play an issue of a contentious
character or a special question of law or fact.42 As such complex questions
necessarily involve a case-by-case assessment, it is inevitable that jurisdictional
questions will often turn on the specific facts of a particular dispute. They are also
likely to be of considerable technicality. So for example in Baddeley v Sparrow,43
certain residents of Bath opposed a scheme of the Commission permitting Bath
Rugby to use a section of charitable park land for stadium seating. Bath Rugby, a
large professional organisation, was already occupying the land subject to a lease.
Apparently unbeknown to the trustee council, that lease had been made in breach
of trust. In such complex legal circumstances, a key ground for opposing the seating
scheme was that it apparently regularised the original breach of trust, so effectively
determining the club’s title to the land. On the basis that the Commission is
jurisdictionally unable to determine title, it was argued in the case—albeit
unsuccessfully—that the schemewas unlawful. In such a case, it must be suspected
that the “real” motivation for appeal lies outside the technical jurisdiction frame
in which the argument is presented, so that in Baddeley the residents were
presumably motivated by animosity to the existence of a large rugby club near
their properties. But such community level animosity is, of course, not itself a
basis for appeal.
40 Jurisdiction: Baddeley v Sparrow [2015] UKUT 420 (TCC); Bartley v Charity Commission CA/2013/0016 21
July 2014 (Ft-T (Charity)); Densham v Charity Commission CA/2017/0002 6 December 2011 (Ft-T (Charity)).
Application: Aliss & Hesketh v Charity Commission CA/2011/0007 31 August 2012 (Ft-T (Charity)); Ground v
Charity Commission & The Guildford Diocesan Board of Finance CA/2011/0004 6 December 2011 (Ft-T (Charity));
Maidment & Ryan v Charity Commission [2009] UKFTT 377 (GRC).
41The Charity Commission has a concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court: Charities Act 2011 s.70.
42Charities Act 2011 s.70(8)(a).
43Baddeley v Sparrow [2015] UKUT 420 (TCC).
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The second ground of appeal that can be discerned from the existing decisions
rests straightforwardly on mistakes of law. The appeal will call into question the
Commission’s application of the statute and precedents. So for example in Aliss
v Charity Commission,44 parents opposed a school merger. Inter alia they called
into question the Commission’s interpretation of the statute, which directs the
Commission to have regard to the spirit in which the gift was made. One of their
key arguments was that a school had a special independent “ethos” which would
be damaged by a merger. The parents were unsuccessful in their interpretation of
the spirit of the gift, but it can be seen from the nature of the argument in Aliss
that any claim that the Commission has got the law “wrong” is unlikely to be a
clear cut issue. Instead, the true core of the argument is that the Commission has
misdirected its discretion, so calling on the First-tier Tribunal (Charity) to provide
oversight. In common with appeals against errors of jurisdiction, it must also be
suspected that the “real” motivation for the case does not always lie within the
legal frame permitted by statute, so in Aliss the parents were likely motivated by
a community-level desire to prevent or protest alteration to their children’s school.
The “real” community motivations behind these cases are relevant in policy
terms. They imply that in the cy-près context, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal
(Charity) will often have a wide community impact, affecting a broad class of
service-users. This will not always be the case: some appeals will be brought by
individual service-users trying to maintain a charitable benefit which they enjoy
alone. So in Densham v Charity Commission,45 an allotment holder sought inter
alia to oppose a decision to provide a power of sale to trustees. This type of appeal
is of a familiar character, common in other areas of law, motivated largely by the
self-interest of the litigant. Although the report is not detailed on the point, it can
only be assumed that the true motivation of the litigant was precisely to secure
access to her allotment.
Many cy-près appeals have a far less individualistic flavour. On more than one
occasion,46 cases have been drawn from a groundswell of local community opinion.
So in Maidment v Charity Commission,47 local residents in Dartford had opposed
the sale of charitable park land. The land was sold so as to construct a town centre
Tesco and some housing. A case was brought to oppose a scheme regularising the
sale, and feelings clearly ran high. Witness evidence reported in the case shows
that when the charitable status of the land was revealed to a local meeting, the
group broke out in applause—an indication of the collective mood behind the
litigation.
There are strong policy grounds behind the right of appeal to the First-tier
Tribunal (Charity) in cy-près cases. It is an area of law in need of continuing
development and interpretation. It is also an area of law where redress might be
of a special community value. These policy reasons weigh directly on the nature
of the test for third party standing: the question of who is a person affected by the
decision. As both rely upon a healthy flow of cases into the First-tier Tribunal
44Aliss & Hesketh v Charity Commission CA/2011/0007 31 August 2012 (Ft-T (Charity)).
45Densham v Charity Commission CA/2017/0002 6 December 2011 (Ft-T (Charity)).
46Densham v Charity Commission CA/2017/0002 6 December 2011 (Ft-T (Charity));Maidment & Ryan v Charity
Commission [2009] UKFTT 377 (GRC);Ground v Charity Commission & The Guildford Diocesan Board of Finance
CA/2011/0004 6 December 2011 (Ft-T (Charity)).
47Maidment & Ryan v Charity Commission [2009] UKFTT 377 (GRC).
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(Charity), they are best met by a broad and inclusive prima facie rule that
service-users can bring cases.
The “affected legal rights” test
Both policy goals behind cy-près appeals—encouraging litigation and providing
a forum for redress—weigh towards a broad right of standing including
service-users. It is intuitive that the more cases which are permitted to filter through
the system, the better the goals will be met. In a recent decision, Nicholson v
Charity Commission,48 the Upper Tribunal developed a restrictive test for third
party standing—the “affected legal rights” test. This section explains the decision,
as well as the policy behind it. Later it is argued that Nicholson should not be
applied in the context of cy-près.
Writing in the Charity Law and Practice Review,49 Alison McKenna who is
currently Principal Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (Charity) noted that the natural
language of the statute, “any other person who is or may be affected by the
decision”,50 is of a very broad ambit and suggested that this might be an,
“unintended consequence”,51 of wide parliamentary drafting. She also suggested
that the policy rationale and its practical limitations might be considered by
Parliament for clarification. In fact, a partial clarification has come from the Upper
Tribunal without the attention of Parliament. That clarification, contained in
Nicholson, marks a narrowing of the test, giving a very limited reading to the broad
definition of third party standing of a person affected by the decision in the statute.
The restrictive interpretation, which on its face excludes service-users, should
be understood in its own unique policy context. The case concerned a decision not
to remove a charity from the register (a “non-deregistration decision”)52; a type of
appeal which has the potential to be extremely disruptive for the organisation at
the centre of the case, particularly in circumstances where a charity has for a long
time been validly registered and is financially dependent on the security of its
status.53 This is a very different context from cy-près appeals, which although they
are likely to be troublesome for trustees, will not normally be seriously disruptive.
The onus of change is different in the two types of case. In an appeal against a
non-deregistration decision, a charity is threatened with a destabilising change to
its status which might very well prevent it from continuing as a functioning
organisation. By contrast, in a cy-près case, a functional organisation stands at the
door of change. In an appeal against a non-deregistration decision, the case might
cause disruption. In an appeal against a cy-près decision, the action is essentially
conservative. Any attempt to prevent cy-près modification is an effort to keep
things as they were.
Despite being decided in the special context of appeals against non-deregistration
decisions,Nicholson is of considerable importance to the developing jurisprudence
48Nicholson v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2016] UKUT 198 (TCC).
49A.McKenna, “Applications to the First-tier Tribunal (Charity) by ‘Persons Affected’ by the Charity Commission’s
Decision” (2013–14) 16 C.L.P.R. 147.
50Charities Act 2011 Sch.6 col.2(c).
51A.McKenna, “Applications to the First-tier Tribunal (Charity) by ‘Persons Affected’ by the Charity Commission’s
Decision” (2013–14) 16 C.L.P.R. 147.
52Taken subject to the various provisions in Charities Act 2011 s.36.
53The charity is treated as suspended until the Commission is satisfied that it is validly charitable subject to Charities
Act 2011 s.36(4)(b).
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of the tribunal system as a whole. It is the first time that the issue of standing has
reached the Upper Tribunal and so it is also the first time that a decision on the
point has had the weight of precedential force.54 In the case, a Mr Nicholson, a
barrister and politically motivated campaigner who had been in consultation with
the Commission, attempted to appeal a positive decision of that body to maintain
the Jewish National Fund and two associated charities on the register of charities.
The Upper Tribunal found that Mr Nicholson did not have standing to bring the
appeal. Mr Nicholson’s connection with the charity was remote, and crucially, he
did not have any legal right in play. That is, he had no legal connection with the
charity. Defining the statutory language in a very limited way and so rejecting Mr
Nicholson’s standing, the judge held:
“[T]he person’s legal rights must have been impinged or affected by the
decision and to be a person who ‘may’ be affected, there must be an
identifiable impact on the person’s legal rights which is likely to occur …”55
This—the affected legal rights test—is a narrow interpretation of the statute.
Only very few individuals motivated to appeal a registration decision will have a
legal right in play that has been impinged or affected by the decision of the
Commission. It will be a rare circumstance. The judge did not specify the types
of affected legal right whichmight permit standing, but counsel for the Commission
made illustrative suggestions in argument. So for example, apparently drawing
from the context of testamentary gifts, it was suggested inter alia that an individual
who might benefit from a resulting trust upon removal from the register might be
able to bring a case. Counsel also put forward the view that HMRC, which might
have a direct interest in the tax status of an organisation, would have a legal right
in play.56 These examples illustrate the potentially very narrow ambit of the test.
Their main practical impact is to prevent ordinary members of the public from
bringing appeals.
In coming to her decision in Nicholson, Asplin J relied on concerns directly
relevant to the context of non-deregistration decisions. The judge took into account
the fact that these appeals, which are aimed at removing the charitable status of
an organisation, might cause serious financial damage to the charity under question,
impinging upon, “private and financial interests”.57 She also acknowledged that a
charity subject to an appeal against a non-deregistration decision is treated as being
off the register for the duration of appeal—a legal outcome which might be
extraordinarily disruptive for the organisation involved.58
If applied as a uniform test for standing in all cases, the decision in Nicholson
would undoubtedly limit the number of charity appeals which are brought before
the Tribunal. The test would exclude a great many potential third party appellants,
including service-users in cy-près cases, from the system. But while this is possible,
it is unlikely. The restrictive approach inNicholson should be understood as located
in the context appeals against decisions not to deregister. Such appeals, particularly
54Previous cases did consider standing in detail, but do not have precedential force: Lasper v Charity Commission
CA/2010/0006 20 November 2010 (Ft-T (Charity)); Colman v Charity Commission CA/2014/0001 & 0002 17 April
2014 (Ft-T (Charity)); Nicholson v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2016] UKUT 198 (TCC).
55Nicholson v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2016] UKUT 198 (TCC) at [47].
56Nicholson v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2016] UKUT 198 (TCC) at [37].
57Nicholson v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2016] UKUT 198 (TCC) at [43].
58Charities Act 2011 s.36(4)(b).
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where the organisation is well-established, are uniquely disruptive to charities,
and so a restrictive rule of standing operates to protect them from uncertainty.
While the affected legal rights test is undoubtedly conceptually broad enough
to be applied in other types of cases, including cy-près appeals, it should also be
noted that Asplin J stated directly in Nicholson that: “the category of persons in
question in each case is not prone to a definitive definition”. She then went on to
state of the test, “[i]t is fact sensitive and must be considered in each case in the
light of all the relevant circumstances”.59 Such comments unambiguously leave
the door wide open for future judges to take alternative approaches both within
the non-deregistration context and beyond.
This means that it is unlikely that the affected legal rights test was intended to
provide a broad template applicable in other types of appeal, such as appeals against
cy-près decisions. It is in essence an attempt to limit disruption to the register, but
it is the sole case with precedential force which is directly on point. It is necessary
to account for it, if only to set it aside, in the development of an appropriate test
for cy-près appeals.
Meeting the policy goals through a flexible service-user based
test for standing
The twin policy goals behind cy-près appeals in the First-tier Tribunal
(Charity)—encouraging development of the law and providing a forum for
redress—are both best satisfied where a steady stream of cases is able to flow into
the system. This links with a broad right of standing, permitting an equally broad
range of appeals to be brought. The core aim of this section is to develop an
appropriate service-user based test for standing in cy-près cases, so recognising
the real ground-up demand for appeals of Commission decisions.
It is important to keep in mind that the statutory language for third party standing:
“any other person who is or may be affected by the decision”,60 is extremely
broad—certainly wide enough to encompass service-users. With that centre of
gravity in place, the most important conceptual questions then turn upon the
circumstances in which it might be acceptable, in policy terms, to exclude
service-users, as well as the circumstances in which a broader test might be
necessary. So prior to developing a flexible service-user based test, it is first
explained why the affected legal rights test as developed in Nicholson would be
inappropriate for cy-près cases and then, why the right of appeal cannot be left in
the hands of trustees alone.
Why the affected legal rights test is inappropriate to the cy-près
context
It has already been seen that the affected legal rights test, as developed inNicholson,
was probably not intended to be applied outside the context of appeals against
non-deregistration decisions, but as it is the sole case directly on point with
precedential force it is of considerable importance for the evolving jurisprudence
of the tribunal system. If applied in the cy-près context, it would have an
59Nicholson v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2016] UKUT 198 (TCC) at [42].
60Charities Act 2011 Sch.6 col.2(c).
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inappropriate effect. The large majority of cases brought to the First-tier Tribunal
(Charity) have been progressed by service-users. If they were filtered on the basis
of whether or not they had a legal right affected by the decision of the Commission,
this would have an arbitrary effect. It would exclude people from bringing cases
who fall within the natural language reading of the statute, while continuing to
permit some classes of service-users to bring cases.
In the normal course, service-users will have no legal relationship with the
charity subject to the scheme, and in consequence, no legal rights affected by the
decision of the Commission. So for example, if a recreation ground lawfully sells
its fields and re-establishes itself with different objects in another part of a city,
local residents have no legal right to stop the process. Or if one religious
organisation lawfully decides to merge with another, members of the congregation
have no legal right to keep it independent. The service-users benefit from the
charity, and may feel closely associated with it, but they have no direct legal rights
in it.
If applied in the cy-près context, the affected legal rights test as developed in
Nicholson would exclude groups of service-users from bringing appeals. Perhaps
the paradigm, and most desirable, instance of service-user standing arises in
circumstances where a community pulls together to oppose amodification cy-près.61
Such service-users will have no formal connection with the charity at all, but it is
not right to say that the residents are not persons affected by the decision of the
Commission. It is likely be an instance where local feelings run very high and
where there is a potentially very important community interest in play.
A similar community dynamic might also emerge in relation to modifications
of religious constitutions. Bartley v Charity Commission illustrates this, as well
as the impact that the affected legal rights test would have on the appeal rights of
faith-group members.62 In the case, the Commission re-organised the trusts of the
Westminster Chapel on Buckingham Gate in London so that they were unified
under a sole corporate trustee. A Mr Bartley, who was a member of the
congregation, objected to the changes and appealed in the First-tier Tribunal
(Charity). His dispute should be understood within the context of a wider doctrinal
disagreement with the trustees over their objection to the practice of infant baptism.
Mr Bartley was not successful, the scheme was found not to touch on doctrinal
matters, and the original decision of the Commission was left in place.
While it is not at all clear that Mr Bartley was acting constructively in this
particular case, it is easy to see that providing faith group members with a right to
appeal decisions of the Commission provides an important safeguard in sensitive
religious contexts. Standing was treated as uncontroversial in the case, so the
First-tier Tribunal (Charity) did not attempt to filter out his appeal. By contrast,
under the affected legal rights test the case could not have been brought. Although
Mr Bartley probably would not have termed himself so,63 he was in essence a
charitable service-user connected to the Westminster Chapel only through his
religious affiliation. Regardless of how closely hemight have felt himself associated
with the charity, he had no legal rights in play.
61Maidment & Ryan v Charity Commission [2009] UKFTT 377 (GRC); D. Morris, “The First-tier Tribunal
(Charity): Enhanced Access to Justice for Charities or a case of David versus Goliath?” 29(4) C.J.Q. 491, 510.
62Bartley v Charity Commission CA/2013/0016 21 July 2014 (Ft-T (Charity)).
63Mr Bartley apparently self-described as a trustee.
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The affected legal rights test would exclude community and faith based
service-users from bringing cy-près appeal cases. Such an approach would be
wrong. Both are examples of circumstances where service-users might, as a matter
of fact be very deeply impacted by the decision of the Commission. They also
represent the types of case where there is real demand to use the First-tier Tribunal
(Charity), being driven by a newly entitled class of individuals which in previous
decades did not have an easily accessible forum in which to appeal.
The affected legal rights test also has another problem making it inappropriate
to the cy-près context. It would select arbitrarily between types of service-users.
The focus upon affected legal rights, if taken to its logical end, would favour one
group of service-users above the others without any clear policy reason for the
selection. The favoured group would be those who pay for charitable services and
so find themselves in a contractual relationship with fee-charging charities, such
as a charitable hospitals and charitable schools.64 In such a case, a scheme, insofar
as it impacts upon the nature of the service delivered, would likely also impact
upon contractual rights. Following the reasoning of the affected legal rights test,
they would enjoy standing as a uniquely privileged class of service-user.
Aliss v Charity Commission—where, as already shown, the Commission had
decided to approve the merger of two fee-charging schools—is indicative of the
problem.65Applying the logic of Nicholson, as fee-paying service-users, the parents
would have stood in a contractual relationship with the merging school. In
accordance with the affected legal rights test, they would enjoy standing if the
contract were affected or impinged. Regardless of the merits or demerits of their
cases, permitting standing for contract-holders but not permitting it for other types
of service-users is arbitrary in effect. It is not necessarily the case that fee-paying
service-users will be more deeply affected, in the ordinary sense of the word, than
other classes of potential appellants.
The affected legal rights test was not developed with cy-près appeals in mind.
Nor is it appropriate to them. If it were to be applied in the context, it would prevent
service-users who wish to use the First-tier Tribunal (Charity) from doing so. It
would also operate in an arbitrary manner. The test would prevent certain classes
of service-user from reaching the First-tier Tribunal (Charity) but allow others to
proceed.
Cy-près appeals should not be left to trustees alone
Trustees have an unambiguous right of standing to appeal cy-près decisions in the
First-tier Tribunal (Charity), but the task cannot be left in their hands alone. They
will normally work consensually with the Commission in order to vary the objects
of their charity cy-près. In line with their legal duty to spend funds effectively,66
they will approach the Commission and consult upon a change of purpose. This
means that they have little incentive to appeal. In consequence, if trustees were
64 See generally S. Moody, “Policing the Voluntary Sector: Legal Issues and Volunteer Vetting” in A. Dunn (ed),
The Voluntary Sector, the State and the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2000), 49–51. Independent Schools will normally provide
a contract between the school and parents. See Veale Wasbrough Lawyers, “Independent Schools and Special
Educational Needs” in Gabbitas (ed), Schools for Special Needs: The Complete Guide to Special Needs Education
in the United Kingdom (London: Kogan Page, 2011), 91.
65Aliss & Hesketh v Charity Commission CA/2011/0007 31 August 2012 (Ft-T (Charity)).
66Charities Act 2011 s.61.
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the sole—or even the main—source of cy-près appeals, then the policy goals of
developing the law and encouraging redress would not be met.
It is possible that trustees might object vehemently to a scheme. The Commission
does have a statutory power to force a modification upon a charity where it takes
the view that the trustees have unreasonably refused or neglected to apply for one,67
but this power is only exceptionally used. The vast bulk of cy-près schemes occur
because the trustees have co-operatively approached the Commission, which will
normally take a flexible and generous approach in accommodating them. Outside
of the most complex cases, it has become a largely routine and bureaucratic
process.68 This is not widely acknowledged. There is a traditional perspective that
the Commission is conservative in its approach to changes of purpose.69 It is possible
that for a period the Commission, perhaps influenced by the pre-statute common
law, took a relatively restrictive approach to trustee requests for variation. Notably,
in 1961, just a year after the cy-près reform process had been put on a statutory
footing, the Commission stated in its annual report, that the law of charity, “[is]
concerned to secure that the intentions of the donors at the time of the gift are
carried out as nearly as may be in altered conditions”.70 This attitude would have
made it difficult for trustees to secure modification. If it had remained the policy
position of the Commission, then frustrated trustees might reasonably be expected
to bring cases into the First-tier Tribunal (Charity) to appeal limited and
conservative schemes.
Yet in contemporary times, a generous attitude to alteration cy-près permitting
far-reaching schemes can be evidenced from the online operational guidance used
by staff in the decision-making process.71 In routine cases at least, trustees
requesting schemes are unlikely to be dissatisfied with the process. Commission
guidance reveals that the decision is a systematised and almost “check-box”
procedure. The guidance contains a number of principles, illustrating the
Commission’s willingness to be flexible and creative in deciding upon the new
purposes for a charity. For example, the staff member deciding upon the scheme
is directed that no part of a charity’s objects are unalterable, and that in some
circumstances it might be acceptable to exclude some of the charities existing
purposes.72 The Commission also uses model letters and orders, suggesting that
decisions are sometimes off-the-shelf, taken without extensive deliberation and
tailoring.
It is apparent from the Commission’s own published reports that it takes a relaxed
interpretation of the statutory rules governing modification cy-près.73 Those rules
are, despite undeniable complexity, in substance also flexible and permissive. The
law directs the Commission, when deciding upon the nature of the alteration, to
work through a two-stage deliberative process. While the statutory language is
67Charities Act 2011 s.70(5)(b). This applies for charities over 40 years old.
68Charity Commission for England and Wales, “OG2 Application of Property Cy-près” (2012).
69 See, e.g. R. Mulheron, The Modern Cy-près Doctrine: Applications and Implications (London: UCL, 2006),
130–132; Law Commission, “Technical issues in Charity Law” Law Com No.375, 2017, [6.32].
70Report of the Charity Commission for England and Wales (1961) 8. See also: Report of the Charity Commission
for England and Wales (1984) 12.
71Charity Commission for England and Wales, “OG2 Application of Property Cy-près” (2012).
72Casework Guidance 3.2.
73 See, e.g. “St Dunstans”, Report of the Charity Commissioners for England and Wales (1999–2000) 7; “Royal
Holloway and Bedford College”,Report of the Charity Commissioners for England andWales (1992) 12; For criticism
see L. Sheridan, “Cy-près Application of Three Holloway Pictures” (1993/4) 2 C.L.P.R. 181.
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very far from accessible to ordinary trustees, the core concept behind the law is
straightforward. The statute requires the decision-maker at the Commission to
weigh the broadly conceived wishes of the donor against the need to ensure that
trusts do not become outdated or ineffective over time.
In the first stage of the weighing process, the Commission must decide whether
or not a modification of the charity’s objects is legally permissible at all. The
statute contains a list of occasions which “trigger” modification cy-près.74 In most
cases, this is a relatively easy hurdle for trustees to pass.75 It is true that some
triggers will occur only rarely, such as circumstances where a charity has succeeded
in its goals and has no continuing reason to exist,76 or where the class of people
that the charity was intended to serve has dwindled away.77 But there also exists
a single broad “catch-all” trigger, permitting modification cy-près if the original
purposes have ceased to provide a suitable and effective use of the property.78 That
trigger, the last in the statutory list, is of an extremely wide ambit. It will also be
read in context, so that in deciding whether or not the original purposes have ceased
to be suitable and effective, the decision-maker will weigh the spirit of the donor’s
gift and contemporary social and economic circumstances.79 Unless the gift can
be shown to have had a narrow and limited spirit, this process of contextual reading
further increases the likelihood that cy-près will be triggered.
In the second stage of the weighing process,80 the Commission decision-maker
will set out the new purposes for the charity. Again, outside of complex cases, the
decision-maker is likely to accommodate trustee requests. This stage involves a
further balancing exercise, taking into account the spirit of the original donor,81
the “desirability” of choosing new purposes close to the original,82 and most
crucially, the need for the charity to have new purposes which are suitable and
effective in the light of current social and economic circumstances.83 The
Commission’s operational guidance for staff is explicit that radical change to the
charity is permissible, stating that it is open to finding new ways of delivering
charitable benefits. By way of an example, the guidance explains that a charity
providing a school building, could instead use resources to provide internet based
education—a substantial change of purpose.84
In most cases, this process can be characterised as one of flexible co-operation
with trustees. Although the Commission might, in a difficult case, refer back to
the intention of a donor and place a break on some plans which jar directly with
the charity as it was originally founded, the broad discretionary nature of the
balancing exercise contained in the statute, combined with the Commission’s
flexible policy and its bureaucratic approach, will normally leave trustees feeling
accommodated. This does not mean that, as the Tribunal jurisprudence develops,
74Charities Act 2011 s.62(1).
75For a practitioner perspective: T. Anderson, The Charities Acts Handbook: A Practical Guide (Bristol: LexisNexis,
2016), 296.
76Charities Act 2011 s.62(1)(a)(i).
77Charities Act 2011 s.2(1)(d)(ii).
78Charities Act 2011 s.62(1)(e)(iii).
79Charities Act 2011 s.62(2).
80Charities Act 2011 s.67(3).
81Charities Act 2011 s.67(3)(a).
82Charities Act 2011 s.67(3)(b).
83Charities Act 2011 s.67(3)(c).
84Charity Commission for England andWales, “OG2Application of Property Cy-près” (2012). Casework Guidance
4.1.
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trustees will never appeal decisions, but it does suggest that such cases will be a
rare event. In the large majority of cases, it is service-users and not trustees which
have sought to use the First-tier Tribunal (Charity). While around 70 disputes with
the Commission have been brought into the tribunal system, only a limited number
schemes.85 Although there is a persistent flow, a more generous rule on standing
for service-users in cy-près disputes may help to increase the number.
A flexible prima facie test—and its limits
The First-tier Tribunal (Charity) has never explicitly set out the test for standing
in cy-près cases. The sole decision with precedential force is Nicholson, which
would be inappropriate. It is suggested that the cases themselves contain their own
guide.Most appeal decisions have so far involved service-users seeking an appeal,
and so the First-tier Tribunal (Charity) should take a ground-up approach and
directly acknowledge the importance of service-user status. Here, a flexible test
based upon service-user standing is developed, as well as exploring its limits. This
test would match the policy goals behind the establishment of the First-tier Tribunal
(Charity): encouraging the development of the law through a wide test, while also
encouraging redress.
A test focused upon whether or not a potential appellant is a service-user carries
with it the advantage of meeting a plain reading of the statutory language: “any
other person who is or may be affected by the decision”.86 It also has the air of
common sense. For example, if there has been a groundswell of community based
service-users opposing a scheme in a context of town hall meetings, then it is
self-evident that the Commission’s decision has been of a far-reaching impact.
The true demand for use of the First-tier Tribunal (Charity) in cy-près cases is
found in frustrated service-users who are dissatisfied with a modification of the
charity. Demand does not lie with trustees, who will likely have been involved in
a consensual and negotiated process with the Commission in bringing about the
change. This means that cases, brought by service-users, often flow from internal
disagreements within charities. On the one side, trustees and the Commission will
have negotiated a change of objects. On the other, service-users will attempt to
resist the change through an appeal.
The First-tier Tribunal (Charity) should accept this source of demand and
explicitly recognise that that service-users have a prima facie right of standing as
affected persons. The approach would be in alignment with the policy goals
underpinning the right of appeal in the first place. By encouraging the flow of
cases through a wide right of standing, the law of cy-près is more likely to develop
and keep up-to-date with changing social circumstances. It has already been seen
that, despite a flexible statutory regime, the case law in this area is of considerable
vintage and in need of updating. In the context of internal disputes within charities,
allowing service-users to bring cases also provides a valuable forum for redress.
It has the potential to smooth out grievances and correct mistakes in circumstances
where there is a clear demand for that legal function.
85HMCTS, Database of First-tier Tribunal (Charity) Decisions at http://charity.decisions.tribunals.gov.uk [Accessed
13 August 2018].
86Charities Act 2011 Sch.6 col.2(c).
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Status as a service-user could not be a sufficient and complete test for third party
standing by itself. It is an important starting point, but not an end point. In some
circumstances it would be too narrow, and in others too wide. It would be too
narrowwhere there are people who have been very closely impacted by a decision,
but do not—as a matter of fact—use the services of a particular charity. So in
Ground v Charity Commission,87 trustees had operated a non fee-charging Church
of England infants’ school in the village of Dunsfold. The school, which had
originally been established by way of a charitable gift, closed in 2004 in the face
of local opposition. The trustees sought inter alia to sell the property and spend
the funds outside of Dunsfold. The Commission had agreed to this scheme, but in
an apparent attempt to keep the school site operational, local residents appealed
that decision. The appellants had a mix of personal connections with the charity,
a certain number of them were linked with the parish council, one appellant had
school-age children in the village, but it appears from the report that none could
call themselves a service-user.88
A test for standing which only permitted service-users to appeal would exclude
potential appellants, like those inGround, who are persons affected in the ordinary
language meaning of the phrase, but do not use the services of the charity as a
matter of fact. A charity, particularly if it has a local character, might benefit a
wide community simply by the fact of its presence in an area. A prima facie rule
in favour of service-user standing would mark a useful acknowledgement of the
real-world demand for the Tribunal, reflecting that it is service-users who are likely
to be motivated to use it. But it cannot be the final word on the question. It is
inevitable that the test should remain discretionary: the First-tier Tribunal (Charity)
should stay open to hearing cases, like in Ground, where people who are affected
by a decision are not service-users themselves.
There are also circumstances where a test focussing exclusively on service-users
might be too wide. The appeals which have so far come before the First-tier
Tribunal (Charity) have all involved small and local organisations. In that context,
the concept of service-user standing is a coherent and workable one. It represents
an intuitively recognisable class of people in an obvious relationship with the
charity. By contrast, where there is a very large class of people who use the services
of the charity, the concept might be much less meaningful. A national museum,
for example, may serve an extensive urban area and so benefit a very wide public
who in some sense might be called “service users”.89 The same might be true for
an organisation, such as a charitable fundraising platform, which is not only large
in size, but might also interact with its users in only a transactional or superficial
manner.90 Again, with reference to the ordinary language meaning of the statute:
it is no longer so obvious in every case that this type of service-user will be in
truth a person affected by the decision of the Commission.91
There are some practical pre-conditions before a broad rule for charitable
service-users to challenge cy-près decisions can be established. The Commission
87Ground v Charity Commission & The Guildford Diocesan Board of Finance CA/2011/0004 6 December 2011
(Ft-T (Charity)).
88Ground v Charity Commission & The Guildford Diocesan Board of Finance CA/2011/0004 6 December 2011
(Ft-T (Charity)) at [1.2].
89 See generally J. Courtney, The Legal Guide for Museum Professionals (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).
90See, e.g. Charity Commission for England and Wales v Framjee [2014] EWHC 2507 (Ch); [2015] 1 W.L.R. 16.
91Charities Act 2011 Sch.6 col.2(c).
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must make a cy-près scheme and a service-user—whose legal rights are not clearly
affected by the decision—must challenge it. The First-tier Tribunal (Charity) would
have to decide (if it did not transfer the question directly to the Upper Tribunal92)
whether Nicholson applies in cy-près cases. Unless the case was transferred, one
of the parties would have to appeal to the Upper Tribunal,93 whose decision would
set binding precedent.94 Without legislative intervention, a prima facie standing
rule rests on a litigant’s willingness to challenge the Commission and to see the
case through to the Upper Tribunal.
Even if such a rule were to be established, ultimately the First-tier Tribunal
(Charity) will have to maintain a discretion. Status as a service-user, while an
important starting point and the sound basis of a prima facie rule, cannot provide
an unquestioned and automatic entrance to the Tribunal. It is too narrow in some
circumstances, but too wide in others. But that is not to say that the service-user
status should not be taken seriously in every case. A service-user based test for
standing would mesh with the policy goals behind establishing the First-tier
Tribunal (Charity) in the first place. It would be a broad and open test, maintaining
the flow of cases into the legal system.
An extra discretionary factor—engagementwith theCommission
A prima facie rule in favour of service-user standing has the potential to encourage
litigation and so help satisfy the policy goals behind the existence of the First-tier
Tribunal (Charity). The focus on service-users is a useful, but not a complete, test
for standing. At its edges, the First-tier Tribunal (Charity) will inevitably maintain
a case-by-case discretion. So there is space for another discretionary factor to be
considered: whether or not a potential appellant has made representations to the
Commission. The body will sometimes consult with members of the public prior
to making a decision.95 Where this has occurred in cy-près cases, it is reasonable
to treat representors—interested members of the public—as “persons affected”
for the purposes of standing. They will have been actively solicited and so become
stakeholders.
The link between representations and standing has a chequered past in the
First-tier Tribunal (Charity). While First-tier decisions, without precedential force,
initially treated engagement with the Commission as opening the door to standing,96
those decisions were directly set aside inNicholson. In that case, the Upper Tribunal
found that Mr Nicholson should be excluded despite his correspondence on the
subject of deregistration with the Commission.
Asplin J severed the link between representations to the Commission and
standing on a practical basis that inter alia: “if engagement were a relevant factor,
it might dissuade the Commission from accepting from members of the public
information useful in its deliberations”.97 And so in the judge’s view, an automatic
right of standing for representors would carry with it a risk defensive case-handling
92Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (SI 2009/1976) rl.5(3)(k)(ii).
93Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 s.11(1).
94Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 s.3(5).
95 See, e.g. Lasper v Charity Commission CA/2010/0006 20 November 2010 (Ft-T (Charity)); Charities Act 2011
s.88(2)(a).
96 Lasper v Charity Commission CA/2010/0006 20 November 2010 (Ft-T (Charity)).
97Nicholson v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2016] UKUT 198 (TCC) at [54].
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within the executive body. Alongside this concern, there is also a further issue in
play. Although the Upper Tribunal did not expressly state the point, it is likely
that the restriction on representor standing connects to the general policy approach
running through Nicholson, which guards against and limits highly disruptive
appeals against non-deregistration decisions brought about by members of the
public.
The issue of representor standing marks another circumstance where the logic
of Nicholson should not be transferred across to the cy-près context. The key
distinction between the two legal circumstances is that, in appeals against
non-deregistration decisions, the Commission might receive petitions from
self-motivated individuals. By contrast, in cy-près cases, the Commission might
proactively engage the general public. This process of a solicitation is built into
the statute, so that the Commission is under a discretionary obligation to publish
proposed schemes and invite public representations,98 although it does not have to
do so where public engagement is thought unnecessary.99 There is no clear statutory
guidance on the point, but it is very likely that where it does not give notice, and
in turn does not receive representations in relation to a proposed scheme, it is
because the decision-maker at the Commission perceives the scheme to be
uncontroversial.
In contrast to appeals against non-deregistration decisions, cy-près cases involve
an explicit statutory opportunity for public engagement. That is a key distinction.
Where a member of the public has been proactively brought into a cy-près
consultation, it is reasonable to treat them as an affected person. They have become,
through solicitation, involved in the process. There is another key reason for
providing cy-près representors with standing: it strengthens their voice at the
statutory consultation stage. The possibility that solicited members of the public
might appeal a decision that they do not agree with, makes it more likely that their
views will be given a more serious weight in the decision-making process itself.
Permitting representors, whether they are service-users or not, to have a voice
backed by the possibility of an appeal in the Tribunal is likely to improve the
consensual quality of the eventual scheme.
This extra element—whether or not a potential appellant has engaged with the
Commission—is a helpful extra factor in the discretionary mix. It brings the test
to a fresh focus, beyond the question of whether a potential appellant is a
service-user. By strengthening representor voices, it also has the potential to
improve the quality of decisions made. For this reason, the approach in Nicholson
should once more be set aside as inappropriate for the context of cy-près appeals.
Conclusion
The sole decision with precedential force in relation to standing is Nicholson,
containing the affected legal rights test. Applied to the cy-près context, the approach
would operate arbitrarily, preventingmany community and faith-based service-users
from bringing appeals, while leaving the door open for those service-users in a
contractual relationship with the charity. This is unlikely to be the direction in
98Charities Act 2011 s.88(2)(a).
99Charities Act 2011 s.88(4).
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which the cy-près law develops. Even within Nicholson, Asplin J was clear that
the affected legal rights test should not be applied automatically and without a
sensitive and discretionary overview of all the facts of the case. It also self-evident
that Nicholson was not decided with cy-près in mind. The restrictive approach of
the Upper Tribunal in the decision is best understood as flowing from the specific
policy circumstances surrounding appeals against non-deregistration decisions,
where the potential instability for charities at risk of losing their status is very
great. There is far less risk of disruption in a cy-près case. The onus of change is
different. In an appeal against a non-deregistration decision, the purpose of the
appeal will very likely be a disruption of the charity’s operations. By contrast in
a cy-près appeal, the point of litigation is conservative. It will most likely be
directed towards preventing a change from happening.
The policy justification for cy-près appeals in the First-tier Tribunal (Charity)
is twofold: to develop the law and to provide a forum for redress. This is best
achieved where a steady flow of cases find their way into the Tribunal. In a
case-based system, the law cannot expand without a sufficient number of litigants
bringing cases. At the same time, if the tribunal system is underused, then it is a
matter of logic that it is not providing an optimal forum for redress. As a practical
matter, limitations on standing are in tension with the policy goals behind the
establishment of the tribunal system and so they should only be accepted in
circumstances where they can be clearly and readily justified. It has also been seen
that cy-près appeals might be of special community-orientated value. They might
represent a groundswell of local feeling against a decision of the Commission.
This is a unique and important type of redress.
In the cy-près context, as a matter of empirical fact, it is service-users that wish
to use the forum. Embracing this source of demand, it has been argued that the
tribunal system should directly recognise the ground-up reality and so develop a
test for standing which includes a flexible prima facie right of standing for
service-users. It has been seen that this cannot be an automatic and absolute right
in every case, but it is certainly an important starting point. There are other factors
to consider. So it might be the case that community-level individuals are greatly
affected by a decision, but are not in fact service-users. Or it might be that certain
individuals are service-users in some distant and technical sense but have no real
relationship with charity. The question of whether or not an individual has made
representations to the Commission is also relevant to the question of standing but
does not key in directly with whether or not they are a service-user.
Despite these inevitable refinements and limitations, this is a circumstance where
wide principle is of more value than detail. The tribunal system is best served by
a broad and accepting rule, applied in each case on a discretionary and flexible
basis. As a prima facie position, acknowledgement that service-users have a right
of standing has much to recommend it. The law would be clarified after the
development of the affected legal rights test in Nicholson, and at the same time,
the actual practice of the Commission in permitting a wide range of cy-près appeals
would be explained. Crucially, a broad and generous approach to standing would
ensure that appeal cases continue to come before the First-tier Tribunal (Charity),
providing a mechanism for the development of the law alongside a forum for
redress.
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